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EQUITABLE DIVISION AND THE
LAW OF FINDERS
R. H. HELMHOLZ*
INTRODUCTION
FINDERS cases continue to puzzle and interest both courts and
commentators. When one person finds an object on land possessed
by someone else and that object is unclaimed by the true owner,
determination of the right of the initial finder as against the possessor
of the land has long raised particular difficulties. One recent commen-
tator concluded ruefully that the cases on the subject "shall go on
forever." 1 Even the leading decisions are so uncertain in their ratio-
nale that it is difficult to fit new fact situations into established
patterns. Only the most confident commentator can hope to do more
than discern the meaning of recent developments and offer modest
suggestions for improvements in legal practice.
One of the best guides to the traditional rules and leading cases on
the subject is a student Comment that was published in the Fordham
Law Review in 1939.2 The Comment has not lost its utility after
almost fifty years and was recently cited with approval in an Illinois
decision concerning money found in the examination room of a bank's
safety deposit vault.3 The Comment reviewed the categories that the
law has developed to resolve finders cases, setting out the relevant
English and American authorities. It pointed out some of the difficul-
ties attendant upon these categories and concluded by advocating one
change in the law-that the distinction between lost and mislaid
property should be discarded in favor of a rule that would divide
found property between the person who discovers it and the possessor
of the locus in quo.4
Under traditional rules, mislaid property is awarded to the owner
of the locus in quo, it being thought that this will better protect the
true owner, 5 who may recall where he set the goods down and later
return to claim them." This will lead him to the owner of the locus in
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law; A.B. 1962, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1965, Harvard Law School; Ph.D. 1970, University of California,
Berkeley.
1. Cohen, The Finders Cases Revisited, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 1001, 1027 n.67 (1970).
2. Comment, Lost, Mislaid, and Abandoned Property, 8 Fordham L. Rev. 222
(1939) [hereinafter cited as Abandoned Property].
3. Paset v. Old Orchard Bank & Trust Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 534, 537, 540 & n.2,
541 n.3, 378 N.E.2d 1264, 1268, 1270 & n.2, 1271 n.3 (1978).
4. See Abandoned Property, supra note 2, at 237.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 233-34.
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quo but not to the finder, who will have disappeared. If the property
is genuinely lost, however, the true owner will be unable to return to
claim his property because the goods left his possession without any
awareness on his part. Thus, it has been thought preferable to allow
the finder to prevail in this situation, unless there are special circum-
stances
7
The 1939 Comment found the distinction between lost and mislaid
goods artificial and concluded that it fails to serve its intended pur-
pose. By depriving the finder of any share of mislaid property, the
distinction in treatment indirectly encourages him to secrete what he
has found.8 The distinction has the effect, the Comment argued, of
encouraging dishonesty on the part of finders and, therefore, fails in
its primary goal-the protection of the true owner. 9 As a practical
matter, a solution was needed which would encourage honesty on the
part of all concerned. Hence, the Comment proposed that "the owner
of the locus in quo .. . and the finder should share in the goods
equitably."' 10
Published cases indicate that no American court has explicitly
adopted the Comment's proposal for equitable sharing. Even the
Illinois court, which cited the Comment's survey of the law with
approval, went on to reject the specific proposal." Such rejection may
well be the normal fate of most such suggestions for reform of the law,
but the result in this instance nevertheless seems unfortunate. It was a
sensible idea and deserved a better fate. This Article therefore reexam-
ines the proposal, evaluating it in light of the case law and scholarship
since 1939. The Article concludes that, despite the absence of explicit
judicial recognition, the evolving case law does provide authority in
some situations for the application of equitable division between the
finder of lost or mislaid property and the owner of the locus in quo.
I. THE PROPOSAL'S INITIAL APPEAL AND ITS DIFFICULTIES
The theoretical attractions of the proposal for division of found
property between the finder and the owner of the locus in quo were
several in 1939, and they have not lost their appeal over the interven-
ing years. Quite apart from the rationale that a rule of equitable
7. The leading case on the distinction is Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R., 228
N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (1920). A more recent case to the same effect is Ray v. Flower
Hosp., I Ohio App. 3d 127, 439 N.E.2d 942 (1981).
8. See Abandoned Property, supra note 2, at 235.
9. See id. at 236-37.
10. Abandoned Property, supra note 2, at 237.
11. See Paset v. Old Orchard Bank, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 541, 378 N.E.2d at 1270.
The judge diplomatically described the difference between the Comment's position
and his own as "partial agreement with the result." Id. at 542 n.3, 378 N.E.2d at
1271 n.3.
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division would best protect the interests of the true owner, 12 the
proposal has much to be said for it. First, adoption of the proposal
would not be unprecedented. Roman law, which has shaped much of
the common law of personal property, 13 employed a similar rule of
equitable division.' 4 Second, the rule provides an equitable way to
resolve competing claims that are apt to be about equally strong. It
comports with what one instinctively feels to be fair. 15 Third, the rule
avoids the fine and artificial distinctions that the law has created
between lost and mislaid property. It is not so open to dispute, manip-
ulation, and criticism as are the traditional categories.' 6
Despite these evident advantages, equitable division has failed to
win explicit judicial recognition. One reason for this failure is not
hard to find. The proposal was made without any reference to existing
case law and did not suggest any accepted legal categories into which
equitable division might fit. It was a call for legislative action, rather
than a suggestion of how cases might be determined within the frame-
work of existing law. Although the intervening years have witnessed a
good deal of judicial activism to change inherited rules even in this
most conservative area of the law, it remains true that judges like to
have precedents for their decisions.
Moreover, the adversarial nature of litigation has certainly dimin-
ished the chances of the proposed rule's success in practice. The dis-
tinction between lost and mislaid property is so fine that, in the
absence of the true owner, both the finder and the owner of the locus
in quo are encouraged to contend for the whole property. The law
allows both sides to claim the whole and present plausible arguments
in their favor. Litigants will not share with an opponent when they
believe that they can claim the whole. A claim to half of the found
property might even be construed as an admission of weakness, a
suggestion that the party is not confident in the justice of his claim.
The realities of litigation thus discourage either party from making an
argument for equitable division.
12. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
13. The law of bailments is an example. See R. Brown, Law of Personal Property
§ 10.1, at 211-12 (W. Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975).
14. Inst. Just. 2.1.39.
15. "Natural Equity" was the stated source of the Roman law rule of equitable
division, and the testimony of many generations which have employed principles of
instinctive fairness as a basis for decision in finders cases suggests its continuing value.
See, e.g., A. Vinnius, In Quatuor Libros Institutionum Commentarius, Lib. 2, tit. 1
no. 39 s.v. Adrianus (3d ed. 1759); Cohen, supra note 1, at 1026-27. Equal division
between possible claimants also comports with some recently adopted statutory
schemes, such as that in Oklahoma. See Okla. Stat. tit. 70, ch. 50, § 3309(a) (1972)
(requiring the contribution of 50 % of archaelogical or anthropological finds to the
state).
16. See infra notes 17-47 and accompanying text.
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The judicial failure to accept a regular rule of equitable division
may therefore easily be explained both by the exigencies of litigation
and by the Comment's failure to base its proposal on any decided cases
Case law development and growth in legal thought since the Com-
ment appeared in 1939, however, have provided a more hospitable
climate for the proposal that the lost/mislaid distinction be discarded
in favor of a regime of equitable division between finder and owner of
the locus in quo.
II. THE LOST/MISLAID DISTINCTION AND
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1939
In its critical aspect, the 1939 Comment has been abundantly con-
firmed by subsequent developments in the law. The years since then
have served to make the distinction between lost and mislaid property
even more indefensible as the fundamental basis for deciding cases. If
rewarding the finder of "lost goods" but not the finder of mislaid
goods ever made sense, it does so no longer, and the underlying
argument of the Comment-that the ultimate decision should not
depend on the supposed state of mind of the true owner at the time the
item passed out of his possesion-is well supported by both legal
commentary and case law of the intervening forty-five years. At least
the evidence against it continues to pile up.
Recent scholarship has confirmed the Comment's theoretical criti-
cism of the lost-mislaid distinction.' 7 Commentators have pointed out
that normally the only objective evidence of the owner's state of mind
is the place where the object was found, and it has repeatedly been
shown that this is an uncertain guide.' 8 One can as easily lose an item
on a bench as he can mtslay it there. The distinction invites arbitrary
decision. Even if it could be consistently applied, the distinction de-
17. See R. Brown, supra note 13, § 3.4, at 29 ("The doctrine of misplaced goods
is apt to be artificial, difficult to apply, and doubtful in principle."); D. Burke,
Personal Property in a Nutshell 103-06 (1983); Cohen, supra note 1, 1010-12, 1027
n.67; Harris, The Concept of Possession in English Law, in Oxford Essays in Juris-
prudence 97-98 (A. Guest ed. 1961); Morton, Public Policy and the Finders Cases, 1
Wyo. L.J. 101, 108-09 (1946); Reisman, Possession and the Law of Finders, 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 1105, 1117-23 (1939); Tay, Problems in the Law of Finding: The U.S.
Approach, 37 Austl. L.J. 350, 352-57 (1964); Tay, Bridges v. Hawkesworth and the
Early History of Finding, 8 Am. J. Legal Hist. 224, 224-25 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Tay I1; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 191, 200-01 (1937); 13 U. Chi. L. Rev. 500, 503 (1946).
But see Paulus, Finder vs. Locus in Quo-An Outline, 6 Hast. L.J. 180, 190 (1955):
Although there has been some criticism of the great importance placed upon
this distinction due to the difficulty of determining whether lost or mislaid
goods are involved in a given case, the reason for the distinction appears to
be sound, and the determination of fact is not unreasonably speculative
since the law involved is well settled.
18. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 1006-07; Morton, supra note 17, at 109.
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pends upon a largely fictional difference in mental attitude on the
part of the true owner. A full law review analysis, published in 1970,
concluded explicitly what others had long thought: There can be no
real difference in what an owner thinks when he loses an object and
what he thinks when he mislays the same thing.'9 The distinction is
built on sand.
Moreover, the stated reason for the distinction, the protection of the
true owner, has been largely discredited because it has little real
connection with this interest. 20 In most litigation, the rights of the true
owner are irrelevant. Enough time has elapsed so that the possibility
of the owner ever asserting his rights is exceedingly remote. To decide
between two present claimants on the basis of a third claim which will
never be asserted does not seem sensible. Yet, this is the inevitable
result of the lost/mislaid distinction. Moreover, even if the distinction
did occasionally protect the rights of an owner who returned after
remembering where he had mislaid the object, it strains credulity to
suppose that the finder and the owner of the locus in quo would adjust
their behavior in the meantime on the basis of a legal distinction as
obscure and difficult to apply as this one. Who can suppose that the
finder of an item that the law will classify as "mislaid" will turn it
over to the owner of the locus in quo any quicker or more willingly
than he will turn over an item the law will call "lost"? Both in a
theoretical and in a practical sense, the distinction stands discredited
by recent scholarship.
A review of the cases decided since 1939 suggests an identical
conclusion. In applying, or attempting to apply, the distinction be-
tween lost and mislaid property, the courts have not reached predicta-
ble or consistent results. A distinction so open to uncertainty and
manipulation is a poor basis for deciding cases, and that is precisely
what the lost/mislaid distinction has proved to be. Cases that are
similar in their essential facts have regularly been decided differently.
Cases involving the discovery of money in safety deposit rooms in
banks furnish a good example. In one 1953 case, an envelope contain-
ing $1,000 in cash, left on a table in such a room in a Pennsylvania
bank, was held to be lost property to which the finder was entitled
after efforts to contact the true owner had proved unavailing. 2' In a
1952 case, however, the bank and not the finder was awarded money
found in an advertising folder that had been left in a rack in an
examining booth.2 2 No real difference in the probable state of mind of
19. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1006.
20. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 1007; Morton, supra note 17, at 110.
21. Burnley v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 Pa. D. & C. 433 (1953).
22. Dolitsky v. Dollar Say. Bank, 203 Misc. 262, 118 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1952); see
Cohen v. Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co., 271 App. Div. 428, 65 N.Y.S.2d 791
(1946), rev'd on other grounds, 297 N.Y. 266, 78 N.E.2d 604 (1948).
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the true owners, as shown by the place of finding, can be found in
these two cases. Yet in one, the money was treated as lost; in the
other, as mislaid.
Goods found under or attached to the ground have received the
same inconsistent treatment. In one 1949 case, two swimmers in a
Missouri river had come upon an ancient Indian canoe partly embed-
ded in the defendant's land and partly inundated by the river's water.
It was held that the canoe belonged to the defendant as owner of the
locus in quo, not to the swimmers who had discovered it. 3 In a more
recent Michigan case, however, the plaintiff, a hunter, discovered
money in a watertight suitcase which had been buried beneath some
branches on the defendant's property. It was held in that case that the
money was "lost property" and thus subject to appropriation by the
hunter. 24 It seems impossible to distinguish these two cases according
to traditional rules. 25 At least it would be difficult to predict the result
in the next such case on the basis of these decisions. 26
Cases in which money had been found concealed in rubble furnish
another example of confusion in the recent decisions. In a 1940 Mis-
souri case, a workman had discovered a metal box containing gold
certificates and valuables worth $12,700 in the rubble of a house
during demolition. The court held that the box could not be treated as
lost, precluding any claim by the finder-workman.27 In a later Indi-
ana decision, however, the finders succeeded in keeping five rolls of
23. Alired v. Biegel, 240 Mo. App. 818, 219 S.W.2d 665 (1949).
24. Willsmore v. Township of Oceola, 106 Mich. App. 671, 681, 308 N.W.2d
796, 800 (1981); see Couch v. Schley, 272 S.W.2d 171, 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
(money found while digging up garage floor held "mislaid" by Texas Supreme
Court), rev'd, 155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333 (1955).
25. Two Canadian decisions are also of interest. Compare Grafstein v. Holme &
Freeman, 12 D.L.R.2d 727 (Ont. C.A. 1958) (employer in possession of premises
upon which box containing bank notes was found held to have superior right over
employee/finder) with Kowal v. Ellis, 76 D.L.R.3d 546 (Man. C.A. 1977) (finder,
assumed by the court to be a trespasser, held to have superior right over owner of the
locus in quo).
26. Facts such as these also raise the question whether found money should be
treated as treasure trove. Most American jurisdictions, however, treat treasure trove
as lost property. See United States v. Peter, 178 F. Supp. 854, 856 n.5 (E.D. La.
1959) (J. Skelley Wright, J.), aff'd sub nom. Dutsch v. Peter, 283 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.
1960); Willsmore v. Township of Oceola, 106 Mich. App. 671, 681, 308 N.W.2d 796,
800 (1981); Morton, supra note 17, at 102 n.4; Reisman, supra note 17, at 1112. But
see Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W.2d 232 (1948) (treasure trove not "lost
property" for purposes of statute); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3423 (West 1952) (main-
taining distinction and providing for equitable division of treasure trove). It makes
little sense to award what may be intentionally buried property to the finder and yet
maintain the distinction between lost and mislaid property for the avowed purpose of
protecting the true owner. See Comment, Finders-Rights as Against the Owner of
the Locus in Quo, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Finders' Rights].
27. State ex rel. Scott v. Buzard, 235 Mo. App. 636, 144 S.W.2d 847 (1940).
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currency that they had discovered in "a pile of rubble and debris
consisting of the frame work of [an old shed] about 12 feet in
depth. ' 28 Why one valuable item should be treated as lost and the
other as mislaid, when the places of finding were nearly identical, is
difficult to say. The cases seem characteristically to reach "opposite
results on similar facts. 29
A few generalizations may honestly be made about the cases de-
cided during the years since 1939. Objects found in places truly open
to the public, like parking lots or sidewalks, are more likely to be
treated as lost than objects found in less open places, like hotel rooms
or apartment basements.30 Cases of finding in truly private places are
apt to be decided in favor of the owner of the locus in quo, although
even this has not been an invariable rule.31 However, in the difficult
case, when the property is found in a place which is neither truly open
to the public nor truly private, the years since 1939 have not witnessed
the emergence of any settled method for distinguishing lost from
mislaid property. The distinction remains elusive and difficult to
apply in any but the easiest case.
Indeed, it is significant that in the meantime serious efforts have
been made to explain the law by looking to factors other than the
place of finding or the probable state of mind of the true owner. Both
commentators32 and judges33 have sought a better alternative to the
traditional understanding of the lost/mislaid distinction in evaluating
past cases. The chief alternative looks to the length of time that has
elapsed between the loss and either the finding or the ensuing litiga-
tion.3 4 If a long period has gone by, it is suggested, the item is very
likely to be treated as lost or abandoned and awarded to the finder.
On the other hand, if the elapsed period is relatively short, the owner
of the locus in quo will prevail in most instances, it being assumed that
the true owner is more likely to appear.
28. Cline v. Webb, 130 Ind. App. 300, 164 N.E.2d 367, 368 (1960); see Neale v.
Kirkland, 486 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (money found while digging
ditch for new industrial development). Neale is notable for its confusion as to the
correct definition of "lost" property for purposes of a jury instruction.
29. Finders' Rights, supra note 26, at 235.
30. See, e.g., Hill v. Schrunk, 207 Or. 71, 292 P.2d 141 (1956); Jackson v.
Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948).
31. Compare Paset v. Old Orchard Bank & Trust Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 534, 378
N.E.2d 1264 (1978) (unclaimed money found on a chair in safety deposit vault
belonged to finder) with Pyle v. Springfield Marine Bank, 330 Ill. App. 1, 70 N.E.2d
257 (1946) (bond found in bank safe deposit room to be held by the bank until the
appearance of the true owner).
32. Finders' Rights, supra note 26, at 240.
33. Dolitsky v. Dollar Say. Bank, 203 Misc. 262, 118 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1952).
34. See, e.g., Riesman, supra note 17, at 1134; Finders'Rights, supra note 26, at
240.
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This distinction has the merit of reasonable connection with actual
events. Yet, it cannot carry the weight that has been assigned to it,
that of explaining the decided cases on the subject, both because it is
rarely referred to explicitly in the decisions and because examination
of the facts of many cases reveals that courts have been unwilling to
apply it consistently. Items left unclaimed for nearly two years have
been treated as mislaid and awarded to the owner of the locus in
quo, 35 whereas property subject to litigation only eight months after
discovery has been treated as lost,36 allowing it to go to the finder. In a
1957 Minnesota decision, dealing with property discovered inside a
bank in 1948, the court held that, despite the passage of almost ten
years, still the bank had "paramount custody" and was entitled to
prevail against the finder. 37 Whatever its theoretical attractiveness,
therefore, the suggestion that the cases are regularly decided accord-
ing to the length of time which has elapsed squares no better with the
recently decided cases than does the "place of finding" test. It too
seems open to uncertainty and manipulation. Even when the standard
of passage of time has been adopted by legislation, as in some Un-
claimed Property Acts, the subsequent cases suggest that courts will
not be consistent in enforcement.3 8
A second, though less ambitious and comprehensive, suggestion for
distinguishing cases decided in favor of the finder from those decided
in favor of the owner of the locus in quo looks to the status of the
finder.3 9 Where there is an employment relationship between the
finder and the locus owner, it is said that the law does, and should,
hold that the finder may not keep what he finds in the course of
employment. This is, for example, one of the explanations proffered
for the result in South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman,40 a lead-
ing English case in which a man employed to clean a pool of water
was held not entitled to the rings he found embedded in mud at the
pool's bottom, as against the locus owner who had hired him. 41 This
distinction will certainly explain some of the recent cases, and it has
35. Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948); see Toledo Trust Co.
v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.2d 661 (1935) (item held mislaid even though
more than 14 years had passed between finding and filing of suit).
36. McDonald v. Railway Express Agency, 89 Ga. App. 884, 81 S.E.2d 525
(1954).
37. Dennis v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 249 Minn. 130, 135-36, 81 N.W.2d 254,
257 (1957).
38. See D. Burke, supra note 17, at 125-31.
39. See, e.g., Tay H, supra note 17, at 224-25.
40. [1896] 2 Q.B. 44.
41. Id. at 46-47, see J. Salmond, Jurisprudence 306-07 (8th ed. 1930); Goodhart,
Three Cases on Possession, 3 Camb. L.J. 195, 205-06 (1928), reprinted in W. Fryer,
Readings on Personal Property 72, 82-83 (3d ed. 1938).
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sometimes been cited with favor in cases decided during the period. In
a 1948 Oregon case, for instance, it was held that a chambermaid was
not entitled to the $800 she discovered while cleaning a hotel room.
The court said: "The decisive feature of the present case is the fact
that plaintiff was an employee or servant of the owner or occupant of
the premises, and . . . she was simply performing the duties of her
employment. 42
However, when one examines the decided cases on this point it
quickly becomes apparent that the results are confused. Cases holding
in favor of employee-finders are just as frequent as those holding the
reverse. Thus, an employee of the Railway Express Agency emerged
victorious from a suit against his employer when he discovered a
pocketbook on the floor of the place in which he worked. 43 The janitor
of a bank prevailed over his employer in securing prior rights to
money he found while sweeping up in the safety deposit section. 44 A
steamship steward was held to be entitled to the $3,010 he discovered
on the floor of a men's room on the ship's upper deck even though the
discovery occurred while he was on duty.45 The federal judge in that
case remarked that "the weight of American authority ... tends to
reject any master-servant exception to the law of finders. '46 It would
perhaps have been more accurate for him to have said that sometimes
judges reject it and sometimes they do not. Another judge reviewed
the cases and concluded exactly the reverse: that "virtually every case"
had subordinated the rights of "hotel chambermaids, bank janitors,
bank tellers, grocery store bagboys and other employees" to those of
their employer.4 7
Thus, although the status of the finder occasionally has been used to
determine priority as between finder and locus owner, it remains
impossible to reconcile the existing cases on that basis. The status test
does not provide a workable means of predicting the outcome of
future litigation. As with the distinction between lost and mislaid
items based on the place of finding, the distinction between finding by
employees and finding by non-employees has appeared incapable of
consistent application over the course of the last forty-five years. The
criticism of existing law made by the 1939 Comment therefore ap-
pears amply borne out by subsequent developments.
42. Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 136, 200 P.2d 376, 378 (1948).
43. McDonald v. Railway Express Agency, 89 Ga. App. 884, 81 S.E.2d 525
(1954).
44. Burnley v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 Pa. D. & C. 433 (1953).
45. Kalyvakis v. T.S.S. Olympia, 181 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
46. Id. at 37.
47. Ray v. Flower Hosp., 1 Ohio App. 3d 127, 129, 439 N.E.2d 942, 945 (1981).
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III. THE PROSPECTS FOR EQUITABLE DIVISION
These developments must give rise to renewed hope for proponents
of the proposal to discard the fine distinction between lost and mislaid
property in favor of a rule of equitable division. It would seem sensi-
ble to treat the owner of the locus in quo and the finder under the
same regime, and thus equitable division remains an attractive possi-
bility. As the fate of the original proposal makes clear, however, the
movement in that direction must be modest and must be more closely
tied to existing case law. Efforts to force a sweeping rule on litigants
and judges will not succeed. Such efforts might be made by the
passage of a statute, although the mixed results in finders cases in
states with apparently mandatory statutes demonstrate that success is
likely to be limited. 48 Even without legislation that expressly addresses
the issue, however, there may be reason for optimism.
At the very least, the evolution of recent case law opens the possibil-
ity of a brighter future for equitable division than it has enjoyed in the
past. The cases are moving closer to the concept of equitable division
under the principles of an established category of law-joint finding.
Though without much formal recognition as yet, the cases decided
since 1939 have laid the groundwork for acceptance of the proposal in
some, but not all, situations. This has become evident in three ways: a
more developed understanding of what actions constitute a "finding"
in a legal sense, a larger body of case law in which division has been
made between persons who have participated jointly in the "finding"
of an object, and an enlarged, or at least continuing, use of equitable
factors in deciding finders cases.
First, recent cases reveal that proper legal understanding of what
constitutes a "finding" has not stood still. Finding is more than the act
of physical appropriation; it requires a high degree of probability that
the item being claimed has no immediately ascertainable owner.49
The law has long been clear, of course, that a finder must have an
intent to claim the object as well as a certain physical relation to it.50
If someone merely picks up an object and casually sets it aside, he
lacks the requisite intent to qualify as the finder in a legal sense. It
now also seems clear that this intent must be coupled with a reason-
48. See Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 84-85, 33 N.W.2d 232, 235 (1948) (holding
Wisconsin Lost Property Statute inapplicable to money found in carpet rags to be
woven into new rugs on grounds that the money was a treasure trove, not lost
property); see Bishop v. Ellsworth, 91 Ill. App. 2d 386, 381, 390, 234 N.E.2d 49, 50,
51 (1968) (holding Illinois statute inapplicable to money found by three small boys
who entered plaintiffs salvage yard without permission and "happened upon" the
money).
49. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Grafstein v. Holme & Freeman, 12 D.L.R.2d 727, 732 (Ont. C.A.
1958); Tay II, supra note 17, at 236.
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able belief that the object is open to appropriation. Thus, one cannot
legally "find" a loose book of traveler's checks5' or shopping carts
within the neighborhood of a supermarket.52 In such cases, not only is
it evident at the time the object is picked up that it is valuable (that is
true in almost all finders cases), it is also clear that an ascertainable
person has a claim to the object. Hence it cannot be "found" in any
sense that the law will credit. 53 The finder's possession of the object
must not be subject to an apparent, and obviously better, claim. 54
In some cases of conflict between the first appropriator and the
owner of the locus in quo, this more sophisticated understanding of
what constitutes a finding provides a legal basis for equitable division
between them. In some cases, the object cannot legally be found
without the involvement of the locus owner. For example, suppose the
passenger in a taxi or a limousine discovers a valuable item. Only the
driver can tell him whether the item is open to claim as lost property,
so that any "finding" in a legal sense requires collaboration between
the two. Such a case reached a New York appellate court in 1963, and
it is significant that the court could not decide whether the driver or
the passenger was the true finder.5 5 In the court's view, either might
conceivably have enjoyed the status of finder, 56 indicating again that
what is meant by finding is more than the simple act of picking up the
object in question.
It must be admitted, however, that this developed understanding
will not support the proposal for equitable division in all finders cases.
It is evident, for example, that where the finding occurs in a truly
open place like a sidewalk or parking lot, most courts neither will nor
should consider the claim of the owner of the locus in quo. 7 The very
location of the finding precludes his claim because it is immediately
obvious that the object has been lost by a stranger. If equitable
division is to become the rule in such cases, it must be by legislation-
statutory or judicial. In many recurrent situations, however, such as
property discovered in rented basements or commercial shops, this
developed understanding of what is meant by "finding" fits well with
division between the owner of the locus in quo and the person who
51. State v. Couch, 250 Iowa 56, 92 N.W.2d 580 (1958).
52. People v. Stay, 19 Cal. App. 3d 166, 96 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1971).
53. Perhaps this is the most satisfactory reason for the rule that a thief cannot
claim the status of a finder. See Niederlehner v. Weatherly, 73 Ohio App. 33, 38, 54
N.E.2d 312, 314-15, aff'd, 142 Ohio 366, 51 N.E.2d 1016 (1943).
54. The found object must be "reduced to undisputed possession." Cesarini v.
United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 7 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (quoting 1964 Treasury regula-
tion), aff'd, 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970).
55. Forman v. Rosetti, 38 Misc. 317, 238 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1963); see French v.
Sorano, 74 Wis. 2d 460, 247 N.W.2d 182 (1976).
56. Forman v. Rosetti, 38 Misc. 317, 319, 238 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330-31 (1963).
57. See Fuentes v. Wendt, 106 Misc. 2d 1030, 436 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1981).
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first comes upon the object in question. True finding cannot occur
until undisputed possession has been determined.58 That can only
happen with the concurrence of both the finder and the owner of the
locus in quo.5
The case law of the past forty-five years also provides support for
equitable division in a second way: an expanded receptivity to the
concept of joint finding. Because the proposal's appeal rests in part
upon a natural desire to treat finder and locus owner as profiting
jointly from the discovery, any wider acceptance of the concept of
joint finding to encompass both of their claims supports the proposal.
Something like this has occurred in the intervening years.
The starting point in the American development of the law of joint
finding is an 1896 New Jersey case in which one of five boys who were
walking along a railroad track came upon an old sock tied at both
ends. 0 He threw it to one of his companions, and for a time they
tossed it back and forth. At length it broke, and money fell out. The
boy who had first picked it up claimed all, but the New Jersey Court
of Chancery held that the finding had not occurred until the sock
burst, by which time possession had become common.6' In conceptual
terms, the intent to possess the sock and its contents, necessary to
constitute a finding, did not occur until the boys realized that what
they had was more than a worthless rag.
What made sharing the money the correct result, according to this
case, was the equivalent status of the boys-they were walking to-
gether-and the postponement of the moment of full discovery until
they had treated the sock as a common possession.62 More recent cases
have gone beyond these requirements. It is now clear that common
possession before discovery of the value of the item is not absolutely
necessary for joint finding to occur.6 3 Likewise, it is not necessary that
the persons be engaged in a joint venture or even be present at the
time when the value of the object becomes apparent.6 4 It is enough
that "if several persons participated in a finding, they are joint finders
with equal rights in the property found."6 5 When the first discoverer is
uncertain of what to do with the object, takes it to others and makes
58. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60. Keron v. Cashman, 33 A. 1055 (N.J. Ch. 1896).
61. Id. at 1056.
62. Id. at 1056-57.
63. See Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 A. 858 (1908); Commonwealth v.
Upper Main Line Bank, Paoli, 37 Pa. D. & C. 2d 297 (1965); Felt v. Carr, 59 Pa. D.
& C. 237 (1947).
64. Edmonds v. Ronella, 73 Misc. 2d 598, 342 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1973).
65. Id. at 600, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
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them part of his discovery, they become joint finders entitled to share
in the fruits of the discovery. This was the result when two boys
picked up a manila envelope in a grocery store parking lot. Uncertain
about what to do with it, they took' it to an older friend for advice.
The envelope contained $12,300 in cash, and the New York court held
in a subsequent action that the three of them were joint finders. Each
child took a third, because the court determined that the lost money
was not found, in a legal sense, until the three children had decided
together to claim the money by removing it from the lot.66
When the uncertain status of the object requires consultation with
the owner of the locus in quo, application of the concept of joint
finding seems appropriate. Neither party can "find" in the full legal
sense without a joint decision, precisely because it will be unclear
whether the object discovered is open to appropriation. The case for
joint finding will naturally be strongest where it is initially uncertain
whether the owner of the locus in quo is the true owner, as where
something of value is found in a small commercial shop. It may be
appropriate, however, even in more difficult cases, such as that in
which a valuable item has been left in the area of a bank's safety
deposit vault. In such a situation it will be immediately obvious to
anyone that the item has been lost or mislaid by a customer. The bank
has no claim to it other than as a custodian. On the other hand, only
the bank can tell the person who came upon the item whether or not
the true owner can be ascertained. The determination of whether the
item is open to appropriation by someone other than the true owner
must be based upon more than the initial discovery in the safety
deposit vault. That determination requires consultation with the
bank, and true finding as a means of acquring legal rights to the item
cannot exist until that consultation has occurred. In this sense, finding
in such circumstances requires joint action.
It should be stressed that such an understanding of joint finding has
not been applied in every case decided since 1939 in which it might
have been used. Nevertheless, those cases in which it has been applied
fit well with the concurrent growth in the legal understanding of
finding.6 7 We now see a broader scope for what is meant by the
process of finding. It is one in which others besides the initial discov-
erer participate, at least while the status or value of the object discov-
ered remains uncertain. When this happens, the law may treat the
people involved as joint finders. To treat the owner of the locus in quo
as one of these co-finders will not, of course, make sense in every case.
If he has never been in possession, for instance, and learns of the
66. Id., 342 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
67. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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discovery only after an intermediate report, the concept of joint find-
ing will be inappropriate. 8 In some of the most difficult cases, how-
ever, when the rights of the locus owner and the initial discoverer are
most closely balanced, the wider recognition of joint finding suggests
that the path is now open to greater acceptance of the proposal for
equitable division.
The third development militating in favor of the 1939 Comment's
proposal is the persistence of equitable considerations in the reported
cases. The proposal was partly based on an intuitive feeling that,
when claims are evenly balanced and equitable division is possible,
the fairest course would be to divide the property. That same feeling
for fairness appears in the recent cases, and to a greater extent than
categories found in the treatises might lead one to expect. The recent
New York decision holding that joint finding had occurred found
support for this result in "practical considerations of fairness and
conceptions of common right which influence just and thoughtful
men."69 It is a revealing statement. Although the judge took the
language from an earlier case, there is nothing outdated or obsolete
about it. Courts continue to look to "conceptions of common right" in
deciding finders cases. 70 This continuing habit of mind must weigh in
favor of the proposal for equitable division.
Equitable concerns appears most frequently in the cases in which
the finder has acted dishonestly. "Common right" suggests that he
should not be rewarded for his actions, and that is exactly what judges
hold. Not all are as blunt as the Ohio judge who found it appropriate
to characterize the argument that a "self-confessed thief" could be
considered a legitimate finder as "just pure twaddle,"' but his view-
point is reflected in the majority of cases decided since 1939.72 The
concern also appears in a positive way. Equitable concerns have
helped to determine the rights of finders. Thus the "honesty and good
faith" of a police officer were important in qualifying him as a legiti-
mate finder in a Pennsylvania case, 73 as was the absence of any intent
to take what was not his on the part of a hunter in a Michigan case. 74
68. These are the facts of Hannah v. Peel, [1945] K.B. 509. Cf. Goss v. Bisset,
411 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1967) (chattels abandoned by prior tenant awarded to new
tenant because lessor had not been in actual possession).
69. Edmonds v. Ronella, 73 Misc. 2d 598, 600, 342 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411 (1973)
(quoting Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 275, 71 A. 858, 863 (1908)).
70. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
71. Niederlehner v. Weatherly, 73 Ohio App. 33, 38, 54 N.E.2d 312, 314 (1943).
72. See, e.g., Rofrano v. Duffy, 291 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1961); Favorite v. Miller,
176 Conn. 310, 407 A.2d 974 (1978); Bishop v. Ellsworth, 91 Ill. App. 2d 386, 234
N.E.2d 49 (1968); Bussler Estate, 12 Pa. Fiduc. 281 (1962).
73. Carr v. Summers, 59 Pa. D. & C. 6, 13 (1947).
74. Willsmore v. Township of Oceola, 106 Mich. App. 671, 686, 308 N.W.2d
796, 802-3 (1981).
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As one Pennsylvania judge put it in 1953: "The right of the finder
depends upon his honesty and entire fairness of conduct." 75
It may logically be objected that these cases merely distinguish
between good faith and bad faith finders. They do not jettison the
inherited law of finders in favor of a simple inquiry into which of two
claimants is the more deserving. Put this way, this objection is cer-
tainly right, and it cannot be contended that acceptance of equitable
division is compelled by the emphasis on fairness found in the recent
cases. The most that can be said is that it is encouraged. However,
such encouragement is no small thing. As the writer of an insightful
law review article on the subject noted, instinctive perceptions of
fairness, what the author called an "attitudinal or emotional re-
sponse," have long had a decisive place in finders cases. 76 The most
difficult cases have been precisely those in which these perceptions
gave no reason for preferring either the owner of the locus in quo or
the finder. The two claims often weigh about the same. Why not treat
them as equal in such cases? When courts balance the rights of finders
and locus owners on the basis of equitable considerations, as the
decided cases show they do, to suggest that courts are free to weigh
these rights equally in appropriate cases is no giant leap. Equitable
division merely carries a traditional concern for reaching an equitable
result one pace forward.
CONCLUSION
This survey of American developments since 1939 produces some
case law support for the Comment's original proposal that there be
equitable division between the initial finder and the owner of the
locus in quo. The appropriate vehicle for reaching that result, the
cases suggest, is the concept of joint finding. That concept, grounded
in a wider and more developed notion of what acts constitute a
completed finding and upon a fuller consideration of the implications
of the role of fairness in finders cases, provides a way for the proposal
to succeed within the framework of accepted legal principles. This
framework was missing from the 1939 Comment. To some extent, it
could have been supplied at that time, although it would clearly not
have had the support it has today. It is the case law since 1939 that has
provided precedential backing for the proposal. The continued confu-
sion and unpredictability caused by the traditional lost/mislaid dis-
tinction counts as a primary inducement to accept the proposal, but
the cases themselves suggest a greater receptivity to the notion of joint
findings and equitable division than was true in 1939.
75. Burnley v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 Pa. D. & C. 433, 437 (1953).
76. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 1026-27.
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It certainly would have been wiser for the author of the original
proposal to have made it modestly. There are cases for which equita-
ble division does not seem appropriate, or at least cases in which
legislation would evidently be required to permit the result. When the
locus owner of a place open to the public is an absentee, it would go
far beyond the case law to suggest that a joint finding had occurred.
When the discovery of an unclaimed item occurs in the living room of
a private house, no authority suggests that the owner of the house will
not be entitled to the item 7 These are easy cases. As the recent
decisions show, however, there continue to be hard cases in which the
claims of the locus owner and the person who makes the discovery are
equally strong. Equitable division appears to be a fairer tool for
deciding these cases than the manipulation of the lost/mislaid distinc-
tion. Such an approach is invited, though not compelled, by develop-
ments since 1939.
77. Cf. Hill v. Schrunk, 207 Or. 71, 75, 292 P.2d 141, 143 (1956) (money found
in private place, with elaborate precautions taken to safeguard it, held not lost
property).
